

Disarmament & International Security Council (DISEC)



Welcoming Letter from the Board of DAIS

Head Chair of UNSC - Winnie Choong

Hi all! Firstly, welcome to the DISEC Council of BEESMUNC 2025!

My name is Winnie and I have been doing Model UN since 2017 and have dabbled in Indonesia and UK MUN conferences too. I am from an International Relations background and had recently completed my second masters in Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability. I have a strong passion for fashion too so feel free to reach out to them if you wish to chat about anything art (both visual or liberal)!

When it comes to MUN, I am a firm believer that it is a unique experience for each individual. You can begin on your MUN journey for a reason and decide to continue for another - and it's perfectly all right! So if you are a beginner in MUN, do not fret. We will go through this together. Most importantly, I hope that you guys have fun and have a memorable experience. Please do not feel shy to reach out to me if you wish to or have any inquiries.

A tip for beginners preparing for council: this is a research report that is predominantly descriptive in nature and a summary extract of a vast database of resources out there. Preparing the best you can means doing research beyond this report by nitpicking on glossed-over terms and reports. Even better yet, analyze, understand and develop your own understanding towards the topic - both personally and as your delegating country. This will hence allow you to be flexible in your approaches and allows for the best possible council experience throughout!

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Co-Chair of DISEC - Jaishivan Sivanesan Paranam

Greetings, esteemed delegates. My name is Jaishivan, though you're welcome to call me Jay. I am 15 and currently enrolled in Year 11 at Tenby International Schools Setia Eco Park. I love to debate, MUN, playing chess, coding and cooking. My favorite subjects are Maths, Science and Computer Science and I have been in the MUN scene for 3 years now having attended 15 conferences and BEESMUNC will be my 5th chairing experience.

My MUN journey began with my first year participation in ISPMUN. I had already gone for a couple of MUNs before but this one really helped kickstart my passion and drive to explore the world of MUN,, HMUN especially. The MUN was filled with diverse new people and extremely supportive chairs which helped me learn new things and blossom into the best delegate I could be within my committee.

Whether you're a novice stepping into this arena for the first time, a seasoned delegate with multiple conferences under your belt, or someone who falls in between the spectrum, my chair and I are committed to fostering your growth and ensuring that your MUN experience is not just memorable, but transformative. As your co-chair, I am at your service. Should you have any question or require clarification, please do not hesitate to reach out to either co-chair or myself.

Wishing you all an amazing MUN experience. Happy MUNning!

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Council Introduction

Duties and Mandate

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and is one of its six subsidiary organs. This committee addresses and deals with issues that are related to disarmament challenges to global security as well as threats to international peace. According to the UN Charter, the purpose of DISEC in the General Assembly is to establish general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and also to give “recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members [of the United Nations] or to the [United Nations] Security Council or to both”.

There are three main bodies that work to provide security through a structured framework. It consists of the 1) Security Council, 2) the Conference on Disarmament, and 3) The First Committee, also known as DISEC. Since DISEC (unlike the Security Council) can only make “recommendations” to Members, the committee is dedicated to the **principles of international security**. In general, DISEC encompasses all concerns and issues regarding arms control, determines general and also specific measures to enhance international peace and security and monitors the progress of disarmament programmes from all three of the bodies.

Given the nature of the First Committee, which deals directly with matters regarding international peace and security, voting for draft resolutions are rarely unanimous. Since DISEC is the only committee entitled to verbatim records, the statements made by members in DISEC reveal significant disagreements in the disarmament debate, hindering progress in disarmament, non-proliferation, peace, and security. Rigid positions by some states have led to several unchanging annual resolutions. However, the Committee has successfully dealt with many serious issues over the course of its existence and its broad representation of nations provides a high level of credibility for it.

Powers


The exact powers of DISEC have been restricted according to **Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter**. Since the committee is based on international principles of cooperation and cannot forcibly impose recommendations or declare international war on any nations or groups, it lacks the power to prescribe definite action. Although DISEC cannot directly advise the Security Council’s decision-making process, the UN Charter explains that DISEC can suggest specific topics for Security Council consideration.

Rules of Procedure

The council will adopt the Standardised Harvard Model United Nations (HMUN) Rules of Procedure (RoP) as its guiding framework, which has been written and published by the Malaysian Youth Association for Diplomacy and Policy (MYADP).

The attached link below provides access to the official version of the HMUN ROP and the flow of debate:

[Standardised Harvard Model United Nations Rules of Procedure](#)



If you have any questions regarding the Rules of Procedure or require further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact the chairs (a.k.a. us) via email.

Position Paper Guidelines

Examples of position papers may be found [here](#) and [here](#)

Outline of a Position Paper:

1. Background of the issue
 - a. The significance of the topic/issue
 - b. The current condition/status of the issue
2. Country stances
 - a. What had your country done before?
 - b. What agreements or actions has your country done?
3. Possible solutions
 - a. What possible solutions would you or your country propose?
 - b. What is the end goal of your country in this council?
4. Bibliography
 - a. Include references of all the sources that has been referred to during the writing of the position paper.

Format

When writing a position paper, delegates are advised to adhere to the following format:

- Position Papers and Emails should be titled:

BEESMUNC'25_PP_DISEC_[Country]_[Full Name of Delegate]

E.g. BEESMUNC'25_PP_DISEC_Singapore_Jane Lim

- Position papers are to be written in **English**. Sections written in any language other than English will not be taken into account.
- Position Papers are to be written in **Times New Roman, font size 12, 1.15 line spacing in justified** format.
- The usage of **bold**, **underline**, and **italics** is permitted.
- Any referenced sources should be added into a bibliography at the end of the position paper, following the **7th Edition APA Style** in-text citations and bibliography.
- The Position Paper should not exceed **two [2] pages per topic**, excluding the bibliography. This means maximum 4 pages on both topics, excluding the bibliography page
- Please write position papers for **both** topics, in one singular document
- Please **do not** insert flags, logos, personal names, or names of the school/university institution that you represent.
- Generative AI (such as Perplexity, ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, etc.) **shall not** be used in writing the position paper. Immediate disqualification of awards if the position paper is found to be written solely by generative AI.

Once completed, **delegate** is required to **email** their position papers in **PDF format in one (1) file** to **both** chairs by the **27th of November, 11.59 pm**. Requests for extensions are valid under the discretion of the chairs. Any other queries can be made via email or Direct Messages (DMs).

Agenda A

Militarisation in Space

Key Terms

Key Words	Definition
Outer Space	The universe beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. While there is no international law regarding where the atmosphere ends and space begins, with suggestions ranging from 30km above sea level to 160km above sea level, it is an accepted belief that the Kármán line (100km
Sovereignty	The authority of a government over itself without influence from outside. Applicable to overseas territory. (e.g.: Malaysian territory includes Sabah and Sarawak)
Celestial Body	Any natural body outside the Earth’s atmosphere. Includes the Moon, stars, planets, and even asteroids.
Outer Space Treaty (OST)	Also known as the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space”, this treaty implemented in 1967 forms the backbone of international space law. Recognized by over 130 countries.
Weapon of mass destruction	A weapon (nuclear, chemical, radiological, biological, or other) that can kill and bring great harm to a large number of humans, badly damage buildings, natural structures, or the ecosystem.
Conventional weapon	Weapons that are widely used, but not classified as weapons of mass destruction. Inclusive of small arms and light weapons. Certain types of conventional weapons are prohibited under various UN treaties.
Moon Treaty	A follow-up to the Outer Space Treaty that explicitly bans all forms of ownership and militarization of the moon, deemed a failed treaty due to lack of recognition.
United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space	A register formed under international law that requires registration of every object launched into space as a means of identifying which States are responsible and liable for each registered object. Enforced on 15 September 1976.

Introduction and Background to Agenda

For decades, the Outer Space Treaty has prevented all nations and governments from claiming sovereignty over any region of space, implemented through Article II, which states, "that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means", and with regards to the militarization of outer space, states, in Article IV, "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." It further prohibits, in the same article "The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies".

However, the terms of the Outer Space Treaty have led to concern in the international community. The treaty explicitly bans governments from celestial ownership, yet does not apply to individuals and corporations. This means any organisation independent of the government or individual may claim extra-terrestrial territory, potentially exploiting resources rather than researching. Countries do, however, own airspace directly above their land. There is no set limit for the vertical height, but it can range from 30km to 160km.

Regarding the militarization of space, the Treaty only bans weapons with a nuclear core and weapons of mass destruction. This is particularly concerning, as any conventional weapon that isn't restricted in terms of usage can legally be placed in outer space. The second concern raised is the fact that in 1967, during the time the treaty was written, there was no legal definition for a weapon of mass destruction. This raises questions regarding the credibility of the treaty. The only explicitly banned weapons are nuclear, and there are no clauses regarding the placement of conventional weapons in outer space or Earth orbit.

Timeline

- **1927-** Members of the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR) ("Spaceflight Society") had started experimenting with liquid-fuel rockets.
- **1934-** Flight test A2 rocket powered by oxygen and ethanol deemed a success.
- **1942-** A4 rocket first object to enter space, landing 193 km from launch site. V-2 developed in the subsequent year.
- **1953-** Chilean lawyer Jenaro Gajardo Vera claims ownership of the Moon.
- **1957-** The USSR launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1.
- **1966-** Outer Space Treaty considered by the Legal Subcommittee and General Assembly.
- **1967-** Outer Space Treaty formed and open for ratification, followed by Moon Treaty.
- **1983-** President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a system to protect the United States from attack by strategic nuclear missiles launched during the Cold War.
- **1987-** an Energia rocket flew, the final version of which according to some reports could be armed with nuclear space mines and defensive cannon.
- **1992-** Creation of Russian Space Forces.
- **2006-** The Space Preservation Treaty was proposed.
- **2007-** The People's Republic of China used a missile system to destroy one of its obsolete satellites.
- **2014-** The General Assembly of the UN passed two resolutions on preventing an arms race in outer space.
- **2018-** Member states increase on-orbit rendezvous and proximity operations, concerns are raised for these operations' potential hostile interference.
- **2019-** India destroyed one of its own LEO satellites with a ground-launched interceptor, demonstrating direct-ascent ASAT capability and raising debris/safety concerns.
- **2019-** The U.S. reorganised military space forces, creating the United States Space Force as a separate armed service.
- **2021-** Russia's Nudol/PL-19 test destroys the defunct Kosmos-1408 satellite, a large cloud of debris is produced amid global concerns about destructive ASAT testing.
- **2022-** U.S. publicly committed not to carry out destructive DA-ASAT missile testing and urged establishment of this as an international norm.
- **2022-** Commercial satellite services used in combat (Starlink / Ukraine) rapidly adapted to provide military-grade communications during the Russia-Ukraine war.
- **2022-** The UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) met to negotiate practical measures and norms to reduce space threats
- **2023-** Renewed public assessments & counterspace reporting: NGOs and think tanks (e.g., Secure World Foundation) issued updated global counterspace capability reports documenting rapid capability growth and broader participation by states.

Current Situation

Today, the Outer Space Treaty is in effect, having been ratified by 112 countries, including several of the P5 nations (United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russia) except the People's Republic of China. 23 countries have signed the treaty but have yet to be ratified. Currently, there is no form of weaponry present in outer space, and no country claims sovereignty over any celestial body. While laws regarding space ownership do not restrict individuals, there is not one person who has ventured to claim space. Neither are there any organizations that have done so, and the issue has not become a pressing matter as of now.

Points of Contention and Past Actions and Current Situations

Defining Militarisation & Weaponisation

What is it?

Militarisation refers to the use of space for military (support or otherwise) functions, such as communication satellites, navigation systems, early-warning systems, and reconnaissance satellites. These are already used by almost every major power. Weaponisation, however, means the actual deployment of weapons in orbit or systems designed to attack targets from or within space, such as kinetic weaponry (Rods from God), directed-energy weapons, or ASATs (anti-satellite weapons).

So the question is where does one draw the line between militarisation and the weaponisation of outer space?

Points of Contention:

The United States, Russia, China, and India, argue that military use of space for support purposes is legitimate self-defence and not equivalent to weaponisation. Meanwhile, developing states lacking a space program, warn that the gradual increase in military infrastructure in space blurs the line and risks an eventual arms race between those with, and those without space programs. Since there is no clear legal definition of either term in international law — the Outer Space Treaty (1967) only bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit, leaving conventional (support) systems unregulated.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons and Space Debris

What is it?

ASAT weapons are designed to disable/ destroy satellites, either through direct collision (kinetic), non-kinetic means (e.g. jamming, cyber attacks, lasers). Destructive ASAT tests, such as India's Mission Shakti (2019) and Russia's 2021 test, have created dangerous debris fields that threaten all nations' space programs, commercial satellites and the International Space Station.

Points of Contention:

The U.S., Russia, China, and India justify ASAT testing as deterrence and capability demonstration, But it cannot be denied that debris-creating ASATs endanger the shared environment of outer space, violating the Outer Space Treaty's principle. Efforts to ban destructive ASAT testing face opposition from states who view them as constraints on national security or technological sovereignty. Thus, the ASAT debate is a symptom of the larger issue, balancing sovereignty and security with collective safety and sustainability for all nations.

Dual-Use Technologies and Ambiguity

What is it?

Many space technologies serve both civilian and military purposes — making intent difficult to determine. For example;

1. A satellite capable of refuelling or inspecting others could also disable or interfere with them. Meanwhile;
2. A laser meant for removing debris could just as easily blind an optical sensor.
3. Navigation constellations like GPS, GLONASS, or BeiDou are essential for both civilian and military operations, blurring the lines as to when it how it is used, and for what intent.

Point of Contention:

Because space activities are dual-use by nature (civilian and military), it's nearly impossible to verify whether a launch or manoeuvre is aggressive. This ambiguity creates mistrust and increases the risk of miscalculation or conflict escalation. States are reluctant to share detailed technical data or flight plans due to national security concerns, which further reduces transparency. Olive branches & dialogue on an international stage, showcasing good faith intent and transparency may be one way to alleviate this.

The Rise of Commercial and Private Sector Involvement

What is it?

The 2020s have seen a massive surge in private-sector participation in space, led by companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, OneWeb, Planet Labs, and Rocket Lab. These companies own and operate large constellations of satellites that provide internet, Earth observation, and communication services. During the Russia-Ukraine war, commercial satellites (especially SpaceX's Starlink) were directly used for military communication and targeting support, effectively making private infrastructure part of a wartime operation.

Point of Contention:

The lines between civilian and military targets are blurred, could a private satellite used in combat be legally attacked? When, who and how does one decide? At what point is the threshold for probable cause? This raises issues of accountability, as who is responsible if commercial systems cause interference or collateral damage? The private actors often operate across borders, complicating jurisdiction and liability under the Outer Space Treaty. Meanwhile, states are divided over how much to regulate or protect private actors in space, especially when they are critical to national security.

Governance Gaps and Legal Frameworks

What is it?

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 remains the cornerstone of international space law, but it is outdated in many respects. One facet is that it bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but not conventional or dual-use weapons. Another is that it requires peaceful use, but does not define "peaceful" clearly. Lastly, it lacks verification, enforcement, or dispute resolution mechanisms should issues arise.

Why it's contentious:

Some countries push for new legally binding treaties, such as Russia and China's proposed Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty. The U.S. and her allies however, prefer non-binding norms and transparency measures, arguing that treaties are too rigid for fast-moving technology. The UN's Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) discussions have been hampered by geopolitical rivalry, with even simple resolutions being vetoed in the Security Council.

Past and Existing Actions

Type	Example	Objective	Limitation
Debris mitigation standards	United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space guidelines (2010)	Reduce debris from launches and collisions	Voluntary, no enforcement
Transparency & information sharing	Registration Convention; U.S. “Space-Track” data sharing	Build trust and safety	Many small/national satellites unregistered
International dialogues	United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Open-ended Working Group	Discuss space security norms	Slow progress due to vetoes and politics
National oversight laws	E.g. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (2015)	Regulate private activity	Focus on resource use, not military control

- 1. Foundational Treaties and Early Framework:
 - a. Outer Space Treaty
 - b. Rescue Agreement (1968), Liability Convention (1972), and Registration Convention (1975)
 - c. Moon Agreement (1979)
- 2. Cold War Confidence-Building & Bilateral Efforts (1970s – 1990s):
 - a. SALT I / II (1972, 1979), START Treaties (1991>)
 - b. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) resolutions (1981-1990)
- 3. Modern Multilateral Initiatives (2000s – 2010s):
 - a. PPWT Proposal (2008, 2014)
 - b. EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2008–2014)
 - c. UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on TCBMs (2013)
- 4. Renewed Global Focus (2019–Present):
 - a. UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) (2021–2023)
 - b. U.S. Moratorium on Destructive ASAT Tests (2022)
 - c. UN Resolutions on ASAT Moratorium and Space Security (2022–2024)
 - d. National Policies and Commands:
 - i. U.S. Space Force (2019)
 - ii. U.K. Space Command (2021)
 - iii. France’s 2019 Space Defence Strategy

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1. Is it right for a nation to have weapons of mass destruction in space? If so, under what circumstances should it be allowed?
2. Should legal conventional weapons be banned from space? And what types, if any, should be banned?
3. Is it right for a nation to claim territory beyond the atmosphere? And what should act as a boundary between the atmosphere and space?
4. Is it right for individuals to claim celestial properties? If so, should rules and regulation be set regarding what can and cannot be done with said property?
5. Is there a possibility of an extraterrestrial threat? If so, what measures should be taken?
6. Should the international community prohibit destructive ASAT tests outright?
7. How can states differentiate between peaceful and aggressive satellite activity?
8. Should private satellite networks be treated as military targets in wartime?
9. How do we balance national security and space sustainability?
10. What mechanisms (treaties, codes of conduct, transparency measures) can realistically work?

Further Reading and References

1. [Loophole Could Allow Private Land Claims on Other Worlds | WIRED](#)
2. [Who Owns the Moon? Law & Outer Space Treaties](#)
3. [Who owns outer space? - BBC News](#)
4. [Property Rights in Space](#)
5. [Space law revisited : The militarization of outer space | by ICRC | Humanitarian Law & Policy | Medium](#)
6. [The Real Danger From Space Weapons](#)
7. [External Affairs India](#)

1. Introduction to the Topic

Agenda B

Modern warfare has had major changes recently specifically because of the enhanced and continuous development of unmanned military vehicles (UMVs), notably advancements in various maritime systems, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems, which were first created to reduce the risks posed to human personnel, are currently being used in conflict zones around the world for surveillance and intel gathering, strike and bombing missions as well as for tactical support initiatives.

The military needs to address three immediate issues because advanced UMVs introduce new challenges regarding military accountability and legal compliance and ethical conduct in warfare. Certain types of UMVs can function with very little to no human supervision thanks to AI integration and semi-autonomous targeting capabilities which have been rapidly developed due to recent innovation. This calls into question the several established standards of human responsibility and rights in armed conflict and makes international regulation and human rights imperative.

Drone technology has become more accessible which resulted in fast worldwide expansion of these vehicles among military forces and terrorist organizations and non-state actors. Terrorist groups, insurgents, and armed militias have taken advantage and weaponized commercial drones for attacks, intelligence gathering, and psychological warfare and more advanced UMVs have been used to create greater damage in conflict zones. The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism reports an alarmingly sharp increase in such incidents of UMVs being used in a hostile manner by non-state actors, particularly in the Sahel, Middle East, and Central Asian regions.

The deployment of drones for counterterrorism missions beyond international borders without host nation permission generates various legal obstacles which endanger the sovereignty of nations. The principle of state sovereignty becomes violated through these strikes because they violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. States have different opinions about these operations because some claim they serve self-defense purposes but others see them as illegal and abusive military actions. The absence of a unified legal framework created by the international community allows these operations to persist with minimal oversight or enforcement hence exacerbating the issue.

UMVs have also resulted in a huge amount of civilian casualties especially in densely populated areas located within conflict zones worldwide. These unintended consequences have undermined the public and caused them to lose confidence in the efficacy and value of drone warfare specifically with adhering International Humanitarian Laws and key principles within the IHL like principles of distinction, proportionality and necessity.

Within the United Nations, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) which is the First Committee of the General Assembly—is a key forum for addressing such global security challenges in disarmament. DISEC’s mandate includes the regulation of conventional arms, the prevention of arms proliferation, and the key establishment of several legal norms for emerging technologies in warfare.

DISEC in the past has addressed UUVs and related topics several times through several resolutions on transparency in armaments and arm deal surveillance, non-proliferation and illegal distribution of weapons specifically to non-state actors and responsible military use of AI. The international community lacks complete solutions regarding UUVs and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) because of this essential enforcement deficiency.

The worldwide deployment of advanced autonomous military drones requires immediate enforcement solutions because it endangers international peace and security. The lack of defined terms and inadequate legal structures and insufficient monitoring systems allows remote unregulated asymmetric violence to become accepted as normal behavior. The uncontrolled use of UUVs would violate international humanitarian law principles while leading to fast military equipment spread and prohibited weapon distribution in unstable global areas which demands the UN to create immediate worldwide regulatory frameworks.

2. Key Terms

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): A type of military aircraft that is piloted/guided autonomously, by remote control, or both and carries sensors, target designators, offensive weaponry and/or electronic transmissions which are created with the goal of interfering or destroying enemy targets.

Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV): They operate as a military vehicle which runs on land or seabed without requiring human presence inside the vehicle.

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS): They are advanced technologies which use pre-programmed conditions and identifiers to select targets before performing attacks without human control.

Dual-Use Technology: This refers to goods, software, and technology that can be used in 2 different areas specifically both for civilian and military applications.

First-Person View (FPV) Piloting: First-person view (FPV), also known as remote-person view (RPV), or video piloting, is a method which involves controlling a radio controlled vehicle from the driver or pilots perspective/viewpoint.

Meaningful Human Control: The principle requires humans to maintain absolute control over autonomous systems which operate in military environments and weapon systems and artificial intelligence systems.

Sovereignty Violation: The use of force via drones or other avenues that occur in another state’s territory without consent from the state or special UN authorization.

Counter-Drone Measures: The detection and destruction systems which stop unauthorized drone operations through technological solutions.

3. Historical Background and Current Situation

The use of unarmed military vehicles (UMVs) has existed since the start because warfare needed them for logistical and humanitarian operations. Unarmed trucks and ambulances served as vital transportation vehicles during World War I and World War II because they carried soldiers and medical patients and military supplies while staying out of battle zones. The American Red Cross operated thousands of unarmed vehicles throughout Europe to perform medical evacuations from battlefields in France and Belgium. Unmanned reconnaissance balloons from the past functioned as early surveillance systems which evolved into modern drone technology for surveillance purposes.

The Cold War period following World War II brought expanded funding for unmanned aerial surveillance systems which the United States and Soviet Union used for their military operations. The RQ-2 Pioneer UAV became operational during the Gulf War (1990–1991) to deliver real-time intelligence support to U.S. military forces through weaponless operations.

The 21st century brought increased growth to UMVs because of better access and wider operational capabilities. UMVs now operate independently from their original military force connections. The countries of Israel and China and Turkey operate extensive drone and unmanned ground vehicle systems which they use for surveillance and reconnaissance and logistical operations. The Elbit Systems Skylark I-LEX UAV from Israel serves as a tactical surveillance platform for ground forces and it has become a popular export for border security applications.

One of the most prominent areas of UMV use today is in border and conflict zones. The United States and Mexico both employ unarmed UAVs for monitoring migration routes and drug trafficking corridors across their shared border. The Ukrainian military in Eastern Europe operates unarmed UAVs for reconnaissance and target observation during its defense against Russian aggression through state drones and military-modified commercial quadcopters.

The commercial drone market enables terrorist organizations and non-state actors to use UMVs for destructive purposes. The Syrian and Iraqi regions have seen ISIS and other groups employ commercial drones for intelligence gathering and propaganda purposes while some groups have converted these drones into explosive delivery systems thus eliminating the difference between unarmed and armed systems. The Houthi movement in Yemen employs unarmed drones to track Saudi-led coalition forces which creates security problems for asymmetric warfare through these technologies.

South and Southeast Asia face additional security risks because India and Pakistan document regular drone sightings without weapons which cross the Line of Control (LoC) and create border tensions. Chinese maritime drones operating in the South China Sea monitor disputed areas through unarmed operations which create rising surveillance tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines.

International law lacks sufficient capacity to control UUVs deployment and stop their improper use despite increasing worldwide dependence on these vehicles. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) does not include UUVs in its scope and international humanitarian law (IHL) governs war conduct but lacks specific rules about unarmed unmanned platforms. Hostile nations take advantage of political instability and ongoing conflicts because there are no worldwide binding regulations in place.

The ongoing development needs DISEC to start right away assessing UUVs' military strengths and weaknesses in current terrorist combat operations while creating rules to stop unauthorized non-state group access and uphold international peace and security regulations.

4. Previous International and DISEC Actions

DISEC's Role and Mandate

The First Committee of the UN General Assembly, DISEC focuses on disarmament of global challenges and threats which endanger international peace and security. The agreement handles three main areas which include conventional weapons control, emerging technology management and terrorism prevention.

DISEC has:

- Led discussions about the military weapon development path of drones and AI systems.
- Supported GA resolutions about armaments transparency which now require drone system reporting.
- Promoted norms on non-proliferation of weapons to non-state actors, relevant to terrorist use of UUVs.

UN and Multilateral Efforts

- The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) organizes yearly gatherings about Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) starting from 2014. States have yet to agree on binding protocols.
- The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution L.56 (2023) which established the first international agreement to establish legal frameworks for autonomous weapons systems while 164 nations supported this measure.
- The UNODA Reports have called for increased transparency and control over drone exports and use.
- The UNOCT Reports (2023–2025) recorded more than 30 terrorist drone operations which took place in Africa and the Middle East.

The Wassenaar Arrangement focuses on controlling some drone components, but enforcement is limited and membership is voluntary.

5. Points of Contention

- International law: It faces challenges in establishing autonomous system definitions because states hold conflicting views about which elements create autonomous systems.
- Ethical and Legal Challenges: The practice of drone strikes between countries creates legal and ethical challenges because it violates international law by entering foreign territory without host nation approval for self-defense operations.
- Terrorist Access: Non-state actors conduct attacks by using inexpensive drones which they can obtain with relative ease. No global enforcement mechanism exists to stop this proliferation.
- Civilian Casualties: The deaths of civilians from drone strikes remain without proper investigation. The legal responsibility for the accident remains unknown because it is unclear if the operator or manufacturer or state authorities should be held accountable.
- Export Controls: The world lacks standardized rules which govern the export of drone components and software and dual-use systems.
- AI Regulation Frameworks: The development of AI and autonomous systems has outpaced legal frameworks because new technological progress occurs at a speed that exceeds the ability of regulatory bodies to create corresponding laws.
- Lack of Verification Mechanisms: Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, there is no UN body or inspection regime for monitoring UGV development and deployment.

6. Important Events

1. 2001–Present: U.S. Drone Campaigns in Counterterrorism

- The United States started using armed drones (MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper) for military operations in Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia after the 9/11 attacks. The military operations targeted essential terrorist leaders but took place without obtaining proper authorization from the countries where these leaders based their operations. NGOs have documented major civilian deaths according to Amnesty International which shows hundreds of civilian fatalities in Pakistan between 2004 and 2014. The military operations established a new standard for using drones to conduct operations outside of national borders.

2. 2014: ISIS Weaponizes Commercial Drones

- ISIS used existing drones to mount explosive devices and surveillance tools and grenades for combat operations in Iraq and Syria. The attack marked the first time a terrorist organization used drone swarms as a weapon which exposed urban areas and critical infrastructure to attacks from unauthorized aerial forces.

3. 2020: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

- The Azerbaijani military employed Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and Israeli Harop loitering munitions to target and destroy Armenian tanks and artillery systems and air defense systems. The drone strikes operated at high speed with exact precision which gave Azerbaijan tactical superiority during its first military victory that drones achieved.

4. 2022–2025: Russia-Ukraine War

- The conflict involved both sides using drones in large numbers for military operations and intelligence gathering and precision attacks. The Ukrainian military achieved precise strikes against Russian armor and artillery through their deployment of FPV drones and loitering munitions which included the Punisher and Baba Yaga. The reports indicate that drone-related deaths caused more than 60% of all battlefield fatalities throughout 2024. The conflict has become a live demonstration of what a drone-centric war looks like.

5. 2023: UNGA Resolution L.56 on Autonomous Weapons

- The UN General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution in November 2023 to establish legal guidelines for LAWS. The symbolic decision established a new path for advancement which all stakeholders supported to address autonomous weapons systems.

6. 2024–2025: Terrorist Drone Attacks in the Sahel

- The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) reported more than 30 confirmed drone attacks by jihadist groups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The drones demonstrated their ability to deliver explosive attacks against military bases and supply lines and population centers through their simple operation in basic combat zones.

7. 2025: CCW Informal Consultations on LAWS

- The UN hosted renewed informal talks on defining and regulating lethal autonomous weapons. The process came to a halt because different parties failed to agree on how to define the system and how to validate its operation. Multiple states backed the idea for DISEC to become more active in its operations.

7. Past International Agreements

Relevant Frameworks

- **Geneva Conventions (1949) & Additional Protocols**
- These treaties form the basis of IHL. The laws of war establish three essential principles which include the need to separate military personnel from non-combatants and the requirement to use forces that match the threat level and the need to hold responsible parties who cause damage. The guidelines lack detailed instructions about automated targeting systems and remote weapons control which results in unclear situations during drone operations.
- **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)**
- The section deals with weapons that cause severe injuries and also spread harm to all targets. Since 2014, it has hosted expert discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), but has yet to produce a binding protocol. The negotiations have reached an impasse because countries cannot agree on common terms and their individual priorities.

- **UNGA Resolution L.56 (2023)**
- The first major resolution required countries to create legal frameworks which would address LAWS and unmanned systems. The agreement lacks binding force yet countries support it through their 164 votes in favor which demonstrates their strong political commitment.
- **Arms Trade Treaty (ATT, 2013)**
- Regulates international transfers of conventional arms. The classification system fails to recognize drones and their software as conventional weapons while dual-use items including motors and sensors remain excluded from its regulations.
- **Wassenaar Arrangement**
- A voluntary export control regime that includes some UAV components and surveillance tech. The agreement fails to establish any system for enforcement and it does not include two of the world's largest oil producers China and Iran.

Key Gaps

- No universal definition of autonomous systems
- No binding treaty on drones or UGVs exists.
- There exists no worldwide system which tracks drone shipments or their military usage on battlefields.
- No accountability framework for civilian casualties caused by unmanned systems
- No treaty exists to regulate software and AI and control systems which operate drone autonomy.

8. QARMAs (Questions A Resolution Must Answer)

1. How can the UN verify and monitor international transfers of unmanned military vehicles to prevent misuse in conflict zones?
2. What export restrictions can prevent commercial drones from being modified for terrorist or insurgent use?
3. Should a moratorium be introduced on fully autonomous lethal drones until accountability and oversight standards are defined?
4. What legal definition of “meaningful human control” should govern the use of armed unmanned systems?
5. What legal mechanisms can ensure accountability for civilian harm caused by drone strikes across borders?
6. What international body or process should be created to monitor drone proliferation and enforce compliance?
7. Should DISEC initiate negotiations toward a binding treaty on unmanned military vehicles and autonomous weapons systems?

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